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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in concluding that John Sampson 
tortiously interferred with Defendants' business relations? 
2. Did the lower court err in assessing damages 
against John Sampson? 
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES 
This appeal does not focus upon the specific interpretation 
of any statutes. However, the decision of the lower court was 
based in part upon interpretation of the Utah Limited Partnership 
Act Title 48, Chapter 2, Sections 1-27. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The original Complaint in this case was filed on February 
11, 1981 under the title of "Robert J. Osborn, Plaintiff, vs. 
Paul H. Richins, Richtron, Inc., Richtron Financial Corporation." 
The relief sought was for a judgment giving full faith and credit 
to a judgment entered on May 13, 1980 by a circuit court in 
Oregon. Subsequently, a Motion to Amend the Complaint was 
granted and plaintiff Robert J. Osborn was replaced with John P. 
Sampson and the other listed plaintiffs in this present lawsuit. 
Defendants filed a Counterclaim to this Complaint alleging 
various defenses to the Oregon judgment and seeking six 
affirmative claims for relief on the Counterclaim. 
In February of 1983 Judge Douglas Cornaby of the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County entered an order 
requiring defendant Paul Richins to obtain a licensed attorney to 
represent him rather than allowing him to appear pro se. An 
interlocutory appeal was taken to this Court and the Court 
accepted jurisdiction as to whether the lower court's order of 
representation was proper- In September of 1983 this Court in 
Case No. 19229 granted Appellants1 Motion for Summary Disposition 
and found that the lower court's order was overly broad and 
violated Appellants' constitutional right to represent himself. 
Additional legal proceedings occurred in the lower court 
after remand. Those that are relevant to this appeal will be 
specifically stated in the Statement of Facts. A federal lawsuit 
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, Northern Division, Civil No. NC84-013A on August 28, 1984 
by defendant Richins alleging securities and racketeering 
violations. 
In October 1985 Judge Cornaby suggested to defense counsel 
that he may be prejudiced against the defendants and suggested 
they request a new judge to hear the matter. (R. 1685-87). On 
October 1, 1985 an order was entered by Judge Cornaby 
transferring the case to Judge David Roth. (Tr. 1699). 
Subsequently Chief Justice Gordon Hall acting through the office 
of the State Court Administrator appointed retired Judge Bryant 
Croft to further hear and try the case. The parties stipulated 
that the case would be tried in Salt Lake County but would remain 
under the jurisdiction of the Second Judicial District. (Tr. 
1752-53). 
The case came on for trial before the judge without a jury 
on January 27, 1986. The trial proceeded through the weeks of 
January 27, 1986 and concluded on February 11, 1986. The trial 
consisted of eleven days of oral testimony together with 398 
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exhibits. 
In July of 1986 Judge Croft presented the parties with a 
"Memorandum and Summation of Evidence" consisting of 177 pages 
and proposed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Verdict" consisting of 234 pages* 
Objections were filed by both parties as to these Findings 
and a hearing was held on September 11, 1986. Subsequently, a 
judgment was entered by the lower court finding in favor of 
plaintiff Milton Goff and other plaintiffs listed as trustors 
against the defendants for $19,057 (R. 2283) as to Plaintiffs' 
initial complaint, and finding against plaintiff John Sampson on 
the counterclaim in various amounts totaling approximately 
$290,000. (R. 2286-88). A copy of these judgments is attached 
To Appendix I contained following the Argument portion of this 
Brief. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on November 6, 1986. 
(R. 2339-40). Defendants filed a second Notice of Appeal on 
November 10, 1986. (R. 2346-47). 
Subsequently, a number of motions were filed in this Court 
by both parties as to the composition of the record and attempts 
to dismiss Sampson's appeal. Ultimately, the court denied all of 
Defendants1 efforts to dismiss the appeal of Sampson but also 
limited the scope of the record to be included to that which was 
originally designated by Sampson on June 9, 1987. 
During this same period of time a Complaint was filed by 
defendant Paul Richins against Sampson with the Utah State Bar. 
Thirteen separate claims were made by Richins as to Sampson's 
conduct. On June 15, 1987 the screening panel of the Utah State 
Bar issued a private reprimand to plaintiff John Sampson finding 
that a more severe penalty was unwarranted since in the 
committee's opinion there was no dishonesty, deceit or bad motive 
in Mr- Sampsonfs conduct, and that he was at all times acting in 
the interest of his limited partner clients. (A copy of the 
private reprimand is attached herein to the Addendum). 
On July 15, 1987 all further complaints filed against 
Sampson to the Bar Commission were dismissed by Bar counsel. In 
July of 1987 the parties stipulated to a settlement of the 
federal court case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
INTRODUCTION 
As previously noted the trial of this matter consumed eleven 
days of oral testimony. Judge Croft after taking the matter 
under advisement for nearly five months entered extensive factual 
findings. The court prepared what it called a "Memorandum and 
Summation of Evidence". This document contains 177 pages and 
essentially is a chronological listing of all events that were 
documented in this litigation. 
The second document filed by the Court is entitled "Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdicts." This document 
contains 234 pages and is contained in a separate volume to this 
Brief designated Appendix II. The format of this document 
consists of 156 pages of findings, 49 pages of conclusions of 
law, and 27 pages of verdicts. For purposes of this Brief 
reference will be made separately to the findings (hereinafter 
referred to as "Findings"); to the conclusions of law 
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(hereinafter referred to as "Conclusions"); and to the verdicts 
on both the plaintiffs1 and defendants1 claims (hereinafter 
referred to as "Verdicts"). The page of the court's opinion 
rather than the assigned record page will be referred to for 
convenience• 
Plaintiffs' counsel has thoroughly reviewed the transcript 
in this case together with the exhibits that were filed by both 
parties. With the exception of evidence relating to the amount 
of damages, Plaintiffs believe that the lower court did an 
admirable job in summarizing the probative facts. The Findings, 
therefore, are essentially not contested by Plaintiffs in that 
they accurately reflect the events which transpired throughout 
these business dealings. It would therefore be needless 
repetition to refer to the underlying record rather than to the 
opinion of the lower court in areas where no dispute of the 
record has occurred. 
As to the issue of damages, however, Plaintiffs believe 
that there is neither evidentiary support nor sufficient findings 
in the opinion submitted by the lower court to justify the 
imposition against Plaintiffs. This again, however, is an 
omission which again can have no citation to the record. 
Thus, after reviewing this case in detail it has now become 
apparent that Plaintiffs' effort to supplement the transcript 
record in this case was essentially a needless gesture. First, a 
review of the original designation by Plaintiff as compared with 
the actual transcriptions reveals that nearly all of the 
transcript is included in that original designation. Second, and 
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more important, however, the Findings of the lower court as to 
probative facts are, as argued by Defendants1 counsel during oral 
argument, sufficient to base both the appeal and the cross-appeal 
upon and therefore the internal decision of the court will be the 
focus of this appeal rather than the underlying record* 
While Plaintiffs do not disagree with the overwhelming 
majority of probative facts found by the lower court, Plaintiffs 
do disagree with the findings relating to ultimate conclusionary 
facts and conclusions of law. Thus, for example, while not 
disagreeing that Sampson made certains statements concerning his 
interpretation of the partnership agreement Plaintiffs disagree 
that such statements constituted improper means of economic 
interference thereby justifying liability* 
It is obviously impossible to duplicate in this Statement of 
Facts all of the events which Judge Croft methodically listed in 
his prepared documents. Fortunately, only some of these facts 
are relevant to the appeal and the cross-appeal now before this 
Court. Therefore, Plaintiffs will chronologically list the 
events which occurred in this litigation as specifically found by 
the lower court. At the same time, in order to better understand 
the legal conclusions of the lower court, Sampson will cite to 
the Conclusions and other analytical comments made by the lower 
court as to those facts. It is hoped that this process will 
simplify the examination of this voluminous record for both the 
appeal and cross-appeal. 
THE PARTIES 
Plaintiff and appellant John P. Sampson is an attorney at 
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law licensed to practice in the State of Utah and residing in 
Ogden, Utah. Plaintiff Milton R. Goff is an individual residing 
in Weber County, was a limited partner of one of the entities 
involved in this lawsuit, and was trustee for a group of 
individuals listed as plaintiffs in the court below. For 
purposes of this appeal, Goff and the other plainiffs will only 
be referred to when necessary to understand their role in the 
series of events. Claims levied by them and against them will 
not be addressed. 
The Respondents Richtron, Inc., Richtron General, Richtron 
Financial Corporation and Frontier Investments are all Utah 
corporations organized by respondent Paul H. Richins and his wife 
Sherry. Richins was president of each corporation and Sherry was 
secretary-treasurer during the years from October 15, 1973 to 
March 1, 1980. 
Richins established at least twenty-six limited partnerships 
in which either Richtron, Inc. or Richtron General was made the 
sole general partner in such limited partnerships. Through 
Richins1 efforts approximately 130 parties invested in and became 
limited partners in one or more of such partnerships. Limited 
partnership agreements were executed between a general partner, 
for which Paul Richins signed as president of the general 
partner, and certain named individual partners, the number of 
which varied from three to twenty-two in the respective limited 
partnerships. 
Each limited partnership was a farm property, each of which 
was purchased under a purchase agreement by either Richtron, Inc. 
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or Richtron Financial Corporation who appeared as buyers and the 
original owners from whom each property was purchased who 
appeared as sellers. The Richtron buyer of each property would 
then sell the property to a particular limited partnership under 
a sales agreement in which such limited partnership appeared as 
buyer. 
In each such resale contract there was a substantial markup 
in the purchase price to be paid by the limited partnership for 
the farm property, together with an increase in the interest rate 
to be paid on the purchase price. Such resale agreements were 
all signed by Paul Richins for both the buyer and the seller, 
with him signing as president of the general partner of the 
limited partnership making the purchase and as president of the 
Richtron corporation making the resale to the limited 
partnership. 
THE CLAIMS 
This lawsuit began on February 11, 1981 under the title of 
"Robert J. Osborn, Plaintiff, vs. Paul H. Richins, Richtron, 
Inc., and Richtron Financial Corporation." The relief sought was 
for a judgment giving full faith and credit to a judgment entered 
on May 13, 1980 in a court of Oregon. For purposes of this 
appeal it is unnecessary to detail further procedural facts 
relating to plaintiffs1 initial claim since neither party is 
contesting the decision rendered in favor of Goff and his 
trustors. 
The Amended Counterclaim filed by Defendants initially 
alleged six causes of action against defendant Sampson. The 
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first claim alleged that from about June 11, 1980 until October 
7, 1981 Sampson acted as legal counsel for defendants, who in the 
first claim are identified as Richins, Richtron, Inc., Richtron 
General and RFC. The Counterclaim alleged that Sampson undertook 
to represent partners and partnerships in matters adverse to 
these defendants; endeavored to obtain interests in various 
enumerated judgments or debts owed by defendants for the purpose 
of using them to defendants1 detriment; utilized confidential 
information received while representing defendants to their 
detriment; and alleged that such conduct constituted conflicts of 
interest, fraudulent attempts to injure defendants, breach of 
fiduciary duty and trust upon which the attorney-client 
relationship is based. (Findings, pp. 29-30). 
The second claim alleges Sampson, as counsel for defendants, 
failed to exercise reasonable care or skill ordinarily possessed 
and exercised by members of the legal profession; that he acted 
far beyond the scope of his express and implied delegated duties 
and utilized confidential information acquired while representing 
defendants. (Findings, pp. 30-31). 
The third claim, based upon allegations of slander and 
defamatory statements, was abandoned by defendants during the 
trial. The fourth claim for relief alleged that Sampson 
intentionally and maliciously interferred with Richins1 right to 
earn a livelihood as a syndicator of limited partnership 
interests and interferred with the other corporate defendants1 
abilities to make existing contractual relations and economic 
expectancies. (Findings, pp. 31-32). 
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The fifth claim for relief alleged that between June 14, 
1980 and January 15, 1981 Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General 
withdrew as general partners of twenty-four named limited 
partnerships which obligated the general partner of each to wind 
up and terminate the affairs of the limited partnerships. It 
further alleged that Sampson who was purportedly acting as 
successor general partner deliberately interferred with the 
rights of the general partners to wind up the affairs and 
liquidate the limited partnerships. An accounting was 
requested. (Findings, pp. 32-33). 
In the sixth claim for relief defendants assert that by 
reasons of all of the conduct alleged in the other claims that 
they have suffered irreparable injury for which there is no 
adequate legal remedy and thus seek injunctive relief. 
Defendants requested both compensatory as well as punitive 
damages under the various claims asserted. (Findings, p. 33). 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
1. Finding: Between October 15, 1973 and March 1, 1980 
Richins established at least 25 limited partnerships for the 
purpose of operating farms throughout the intermountain area. 
(Findings, p. 28). Each limited partnership had its own 
separate agreement signed by Richins as president of either 
Richtron, Inc. or Richtron General as general partner and by each 
investor in the particular limited partnership. The content of 
each agreement was identical, except as to dates, description of 
the property, the names of the investors and the amounts of the 
initial capital. 
2. Finding: As of May, 1980, the evidence suggests a 
bleak outlook for the future in the overall operation of the 
limited partnerships by Richins. This was caused by (1) the 
failure of many limited partners to pay their assessed capital 
contribution which they had agreed to in their respective 
partnership agreements and (2) the failure of Richins as 
president of the general partners of each partnership to fulfill 
the duties and responsibilities he had to the limited partners 
under the partnership agreements. (Findings, pp. 54-57). 
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The court listed numerous problems with the farm properties 
in the latter part of 1979 and the early part of 1980, 
(Findings, pp. 60-64). In summary, the court stated that by May 
of 1980 there was dissatisfaction of the partnership affairs 
together with a lack of meaningful information from the general 
partner, the existence of judgments, troubles and tax problems, a 
state security commission investigation, a revocation of RFCfs 
certificate of authority in Oregon, the failure of many limited 
partners to pay their assessments and Richins1 failure to do 
anything about it. (Findings, p. 72). 
Conclusion: By May of 1980 Richins had so mismanaged 
partnership affairs that it did not have sufficient funds to pay 
installments owed to RFC, so RFC could not pay its installment 
obligation to the contract sellers. Substantial judgment were 
obtained for failure to pay partnership obligations. Partners 
were angry because of Richins1 failure to follow the partnership 
agreement upon assessment and failure to pay; to give an audited 
annual report to each, to have the properties appraised by a 
qualified appraiser and to give the partners a report of the 
holdings and to advise them regarding advances and obligations 
with respect thereto. (Verdict, p. 229). 
3. Finding: On or about May 21, 1980 Richins had his 
first contact with Sampson concerning this action. Sampson 
called Richins, stating he was calling on behalf of Milton Goff 
and had some questions about the Catlow Valley Property—one of 
the limited partnerships. Richins told Sampson he was going to 
call a meeting of the Catlow Valley limited partners to tell them 
about the judgments that had been entered against the partnership 
and other problems. (Findings, p. 7). 
4. Finding: On May 29, 1980 a meeting of the limited 
partners of the seven Catlow Valley farm partnerships was 
attended by about thirty limited partners. Its purpose was to 
discuss the critical financial condition of those partnerships 
and the need to act as to a sheriff's sale set for the following 
month. Richins advised those present that $140,000 had to 
be raised immediately to stop the sale and that an additional 
$30,000 to $50,000 was needed to continue drilling water wells. 
The total amount of money then needed to pay the obligations owed 
was computed at $240,000. (Findings, p. 63). 
5. Finding: Sampson representing limited partners 
Goff and Kohler suggested that RFC file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
as an alternative. He also stated that he did not think RFC 
could keep the markup equity because it was a breach of fiduciary 
responsibility for a general partner to buy property at one price 
and to sell it to a partnership at a profit. This was a theme 
which Sampson repeatedly expressed in the months and years ahead. 
Richins disagreed with Sampsonfs conclusion but did agree to file 
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy on behalf of RFC. (Findings, pp. 36-37). 
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Conclusion: The court states that it does not believe 
that the markup in the contract price for which RFC or Richtron, 
Inc. sold farm property to a partnership by contract was a breach 
of fiduciary duty which rendered such contract or the markup 
illegal or void. The statement by Sampson was therefore 
erroneous. (Conclusion, p. 189). 
6. Finding: It was agreed at this meeting that $17,000 
would be raised by the limited partners for the purpose of 
attorneys1 fees and other expenses. When the limited partners 
raised the question as to who would have custody of the funds 
Richins suggested that Ken Hansen be appointed for that purpose. 
(Findings, pp. 64-5). 
7. Finding: On May 30, 1980 a meeting of the Snowville 
limited partnership was held at which time they employed Sampson 
as legal counsel for the partnership and requested Sampson to 
take necessary steps to relieve Richtron as general partner and 
to liquidate in an orderly manner. They decided they would not 
pay contributions requested by Richins until after an audit was 
completed but would make contributions to meet the July 1st 
payment on the property if advised to do so by Sampson. It was 
also agreed to request the Springfield and Morland limited 
partnerships to do likewise. (Findings, p. 64). 
8. Finding: On June 2 and June 5, Richins as the general 
partner in the partnerships executed quit claim deeds by which 
all of the limited partnerships conveyed to RFC the real property 
previously acquired by them. These deeds were executed without 
advising any investor or partnerships. The apparent basis for 
such deeds was the failure of the partnerships to keep current 
the payments due RFC on the real estate contracts by which the 
partnerships had purchased their farm lands from RFC. 
Conclusion: The undisclosed execution by Richins as 
president of the general partner of the quit claim deeds on or 
about June 2 and 5, 1980 which deeds purported to convey all 
partnership properties to RFC was contrary to law and void. This 
effort would have essentially deprived the partnerships of their 
only assets making it impossible for them to carry on ordinary 
business. This action violated §48-2-9(2) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. It is difficult to conceive of any circumstance 
falling more closely into the statutory provision requiring 
notice and written consent of limited partners than the secretive 
conveyance of the partnership farms to a third party. 
(Conclusion, pp. 168-69). 
9. Finding: On June 5, 1980 Richins prepared and 
signed as president of Richtron, Inc., the general partner, 
eighteen promissory notes which obligated the limited 
partnerships of the note issued to pay Richtron, Inc., Richtron 
General, or RFC, or their respective successors or assigns, the 
greater amount of the principal sum named therein or the total of 
the aggregate advances made to the partnership by the holder as 
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defined in the limited partnership agreement. (Findings, 
pp. 65-66). 
Conclusion: The court found that while the general 
partners advanced funds under the partnership agreement they did 
not comply with Article V{1)(c) of the various agreements since 
there were no loan instruments prepared when such advances were 
made. The court specifically found that the promissory notes 
dated June 5, 1980 did not constitute a loan instrument as used 
in the partnership agreement. The money, therefore, could only 
be repaid at the time of termination of the partnership assuming 
sufficient assets were still available. (Findings, pp. 102-03). 
10. Finding: On June 9, 1980 the Blackfoot limited 
partners had a meeting attended by both Richins and Sampson. 
Sampson stated his opinion that the markup on the propert was a 
breach of fiduciary duty and that Richtron was not entitled to 
the repayment of advances made to the limited partnership. 
Sampson throughout these events continually maintained that the 
general partners were not entitled to repayment of the advances 
they allegedly made. (Findings, p. 66). 
Conclusion: Sampson's advice as to the repayment of 
advances was erroneous. While the money was not due and owing to 
the general partner immediately it was a legitimate debt upon 
termination of the partnership. (Conclusions, pp. 166, 170). 
11. Finding: At the June 9, 1980 Blackfoot director 
meeting some of the limited partners expressed their 
dissatisfaction of Richins'performance. Richins stated that if 
they were not satisfied they could repay the advances, agree to 
pay in full for the personal property and could elect a new and 
more compatible general partner to take Richtron's place. He 
said that if they refused he might withdraw Richtron as a 
general partner and effect a dissolution and liquidation thereby 
forcing settlement of accounts and he would not consent to the 
election of a new general partner. On June 10 he sent a letter 
to the limited partners of Blackfoot and stated he was filing 
notice of Richtron, Inc.'s withdrawal as general partner. He 
demanded they repay advances of $25,000 and that they elect a 
new general partner to fill the vacancy but also stated that 
the partnership was terminated and its affairs were to be 
wound up. (Findings, p. 66-67). 
Conclusion: The court stated that Richins gave contrary 
instructions when he informed the Blackfoot partners as well as 
two others that he had withdrawn as the general partner and that 
they should go ahead and elect a new general partner while at the 
same time telling them that the partnership had been terminated 
and that the assets would have to be distributed. This raised 
confusion in the minds of the limited partners as to what they 
were expected to do. He placed his own erroneous interpretation 
of §48-2-20, U.C.A. (Conclusion, pp. 170-171). 
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12. Finding: On June 26, 1980 a large number of 
limited partners met with Sampson and Richins to discuss the 
problems taking place. Richins advised them that he had advanced 
$350,000 and that many limited partners had failed to pay their 
assessments. He stated that $300,000 was needed in the immediate 
future and $60,000 was needed immediately. Sampson stated that 
he was present at the meeting to advise Kohler and Goff about 
their pension and profit sharing investments. After several 
heated discussions it was agreed that Sampson and his associates 
would buy out Richins for $700,000 with an interest rate of 13%. 
(Findings, p. 37-38, 68). 
13. Finding: Richins told Sampson that he anticipated 
creditors filing lawsuits during the next few months. Sampson 
said he would answer them and stall off the creditors and that 
once the agreement had been consummated he would like to continue 
as legal counsel for Richtron. The limited partners all agreed 
Sampson should represent their interests. At the same time with 
the probability of a settlement existing, at the insistence of 
active limited partners and with Richins1 consent Sampson became 
the recipient of partnership funds paid by some limited partners 
for assessments. He was charged with maintaining control over 
how such funds were to be spent with such initial arrangements 
including an agreement for Sampson to pass the funds through to 
Richins for payment of pressing obligations. (Findings, pp. 
38-39, 68). 
Conclusion: Legally Richins had no authority to consent 
to Sampson's role in the collection of funds nor did the limited 
partners have the authority to hire a lawyer to represent them. 
However, in view of the tentative agreement for a settlement 
these factors should not be given much weigh in determining the 
legality of what Sampson did in the months that followed. 
(Conclusions, p. 171). 
14. Finding: During the summer and early fall of 1980 
Sampson undertook various legal matters on behalf of the limited 
partners and the general partners. These included such acts as 
answering lawsuits, attempting to negotiate settlements, and 
attending trustee sales. All of these activities are outlined in 
the court1s Findings, pages 39-43. 
Conclusion: The court concluded that during the summer 
and fall of 1980 an attorney-client relationship existed between 
Sampson, Richins, and Richtron companies. The court found that 
the breach of fiduciary duty violated ethical standards adopted 
by the Bar Association and is part of the overall conduct of 
Sampson said to be tortious. (Conclusion, pp. 164-65). 
15. Finding: On October 2, 1980 Sampson sent to all 
investors a copy of the completed compromise and settlement 
agreement and urged them to sign it and return it immediately to 
Richins. The agreement as drafted had received the approval of 
both Richins and Sampson and afforded the gateway through which 
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the controversies could be resolved. Although many limited 
partners signed it, others did not and so this agreement was 
never consummated. (Findings, pp. 68-69). 
16. Finding: Following falure of having the settlement 
agreement consumated, Richins on November 13, 1980 drafted and 
executed a notice of withdrawal of the general partner which he 
then sent to the limited partners of six partnerships. On 
January 6, 1981 identical notices were mailed to the limited 
partners of 18 other partnerships. (Findings, p. 69). By 
separate letter Richins advised the limited partners that the 
general partner had withdrawn, the partnerships were terminated, 
and affairs would be wound up as indicated in the partnership 
agreements. (Id.). 
Conclusion: Richins1 statement in these notices that 
the partnerships had automatically terminated was erroneous. 
Article V of the partnership agreement does not state that 
withdrawal of a general partner automatically dissolves the 
partnership. Article VII of the agreement allows the limited 
partners to elect a new general partner upon the withdrawal of 
the old general partner. (Findings, pp. 70-72). The court 
further stated that while Richins relied upon §48-2-20, U.C.A. 
that this section was not applicable to this case and that it was 
necessary to look instead to the certificate of partnership 
agreement as to the responsibility arising out of the withdrawal 
of a general partner. As a matter of law, the limited partners 
had the right to elect a new general partner without terminating 
the partnership. (Conclusions, pp. 177-78). 
17. Finding: Although Richins stated that he would 
immediately begin to wind up all of the partnership entities 
there is no evidence that he undertook any such action. The 
court stated, "We search in vain for evidence of any affirmative 
action by Richins to have the general partners undertake the 
promised wind-up of partnership affairs." (Findings, pp. 
69-70) . 
Conclusion: Of great importance as to determining the 
losses to the various partnerships was Richins' own failure to 
undertake efforts to wind up partnership affairs and bring about 
dissolution and termination with any resulting benefits to all 
concerned. The courts were there to help him do so but he never 
used them for that purpose. Even in this litigation Richins did 
not seek a windup and dissolution by this court. (Verdict, pp. 
229-30) . 
18. Finding: In December of 1980 Sampson sent out 
letters to all of the limited partners requesting that they 
return to him a signed power of attorney which would give him the 
ability to vote their rights. He informed them that settlement 
had failed and that it was necessary to sign these powers in 
order to remove Richins and his companies as general partners and 
to retain the properties and preserve legal remedies. The powers 
-1 £_ 
of attorney stated that they were to be irrevocable for six 
months and to continue on until otherwise notified. (Findings, 
p. 76) . 
19. Finding: At this same time Sampson incorporated the 
John P. Sampson professional corporation and using the powers 
of attorney given to him by the various limited partnership 
undertook to vote the Richtron companies out as general partners 
and voted his own professional corporation in as the new 
substitute general partner. Sampson executed several documents 
to this effect and recorded noticies of substitution as an 
amendment to the certificate of partnership agreement. In March 
1981 he again executed other documents attempting to substitute 
his professional corporation as the general partner. (Findings, 
pp. 76-77) . 
Conclusion: The court ruled that as a matter of law 
Sampson did not legally substitute his professional corporation 
for that of the defendants since §48-2-24(d) requires that an 
amended certificate be signed and sworn to by all limited 
partners. Since it was only signed by Sampson the attempted 
substitution was invalid ab initio as not being in conformity 
with law and had no force or effect in removing the Richtron 
general partners. (Conclusions, p. 182). 
20. Finding: A stipulated judgment had been entered 
in Oregon against the defendants on behalf of Robert Osborn. The 
judgment was entered on May 13, 1980 for $75,683.00. (Findings, 
p. 6). During January of 1981 Sampson negotiated with the 
attorney for Osborn and purchased the Osborn judgment for 
$20,000 down and $20,000 more to be paid in three months. A 
complaint was filed on February 11, 1981 with Osborn being named 
as plaintiff seeking enforcement of the Oregon judgment. In 
March the amended complaint was amended to reflect Sampson's name 
as the real party in interest. Subsequently, the original 
assignment of the suit was revoked because of Sampson's failure 
to pay the remaining $20,000. Later, however, the assignment was 
reinstated upon payment by Goff on behalf of other limited 
partners who are now named parties to this lawsuit. (Findings, 
pp. 10-13) . 
Conclusion: The court concluded that the purchase of 
this judgment by Sampson was in direct violation of §78-51-27 
U.C.A. which prohibits attorneys from purchasing such judgments. 
Further, when Sampson obtained the second assignment on behalf of 
Goff and the other trustees he violated the section a second 
time. (Findings, pp. 109-10). 
21. Finding: At this time the RFC bankruptcy 
proceedings were still alive and Sampson was notified by the 
Bankruptcy Court that a professional legal corporation was not 
authorized to become a general partner in an agricultural 
enterprise. On March 23, 1981 Sampson, incorporated AG 
Management, Inc. of which he was one of its incorporators, 
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directors and the president. After doing so Sampson took 
steps to substitute AG Management for his PC as general 
partner of each partnership. (Findings, p. 78), 
Conclusion: Sampson's attempted substitution of AG 
Management as general partner of each partnership in place of 
Sampsonfs PC without filing an amended certificate showing 
such change was contrary to law, a nullity, and gave AG 
Management no authority to act as such, (Conclusions, p. 192). 
22. Finding: At the end of 1980 and into 1981 Sampson 
repeatedly solicited funds from the limited partners directing 
that the funds be sent to him and not to Richins. He determined 
the manner in which such funds were to be used and did so in the 
months and years ahead. From the end of June 1980 through 
November 1982 he received and disbursed at least $645,000 from 
and for the limited partners and their partnerships. The 
evidence showed that Sampson kept detailed records of his 
receipts and disbursements. (Findings, p. 79). 
23, Finding: Sampson, as counsel for Goff and certain 
limited partners, attended an IRS tax sale on October 29, 1982 
relating to Richins and Richtron interests. As the only bidder 
they bid in $40,000 to purchase all of Richins1 claims in the 
partnerships, the Richins entities, the purchase and resale 
contracts and stock in the Richtron companies. These assets the 
IRS has purportedly taken by some thirty-five IRS seizures and 
levies. (Findings, pp. 81-2). 
240 Finding: In a case filed in the District Court in 
Davis County entitled "Blackfoot Farms, et al. v. Paul H. 
Richins, Richtron Inc., RFC, et al." Judge Duffy Palmer entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 24, 1982 
wherein he ruled that AG Management was not the general partner 
of any of the partnerships; that Richtron, Inc. and Richtron 
General were the liquidating general partners; that 
notwithstanding their withdrawals they were still in control of 
the partnership; and that the partnership certificates were never 
amended to admit AG Management ^s a general partner. (Findings, 
pp. 80-1). 
25. Finding: Notwithstanding Sampson's setback in the 
face of Judge Palmer's ruling, Sampson continued to lay claim to 
and hold for his clients all of the Richins and Richtron rights 
and interests in the partnerships and their properties, 
including, as noted, all stock in the Richtron companies, doing 
so by reason of the procedural consequences of the IRS tax sale. 
(Findings , p. 32) . 
26. Finding: Emphasis was added to the legality of 
Sampson's claims by two subsequent court rulings made by Judge 
Cornaby in the District Court of Davis County, one on December 
27, 1982, and the second on July 21, 1983. In both cases Judge 
Cornaby ruled that the IRS sale was valid, that Goff was the 
purchaser of all Richins and Richtron property interest as 
evidenced and described by the IRS1 certificate of sale, and that 
such sale covered all property interest, all causes of action, 
and all rights to wind up the affairs of the limited partners of 
which the Richtron companies had been general partners, 
(Findings, p. 82). 
27. Finding: On May 16, 1984 Judge David Winder of 
the United States District Court for Utah entered an order which 
fully and unequivocably voided the IRS tax sale declaring that 
Goff had no interest in the capital stock of the Richtron 
companies, in the right of those companies to wind up partnership 
affairs, nor the right to institute causes of action. (Findings, 
p. 83) . 
28. Finding: After losing the IRS ruling Sampson and 
Richins wrote letters to each other as well as the limited 
partners at which time Sampson said that all the farms had been 
foreclosed upon and that they had been purchased directly from 
the individual sellers and therefore Richins and his companies no 
longer had any interest. The list of foreclosures introduced by 
Richins at trial indicates that all farms had been foreclosed 
upon by the dates of these letter exchanges. (Findings, p. 85). 
29. Finding: Although Judge Winder's ruling was on 
May 16, 1984 Richins took no action to vacate Judge Cornaby's 
prior orders until January 3, 1985 when he finally filed a motion 
to do so. Based upon Judge Winder's decision, Judge Cornaby on 
February 15, 1985 made a ruling vacating his prior two orders 
because they had been based upon the assumption that the IRS sale 
was valid. (Findings, pp, 83-4). 
30. Finding: There is no evidence in the record as to 
what became of various partnership properties although Richins 
testified at trial that none of the limited partners to his 
knowledge ever received any return on their investments. It is a 
reasonable inference that payments due to the original owners as 
sellers were not made; that those contracts fell into default; 
that a substantial reason therefore was that no money was 
available to meet such payments, and that the probable reason was 
the failure of many limited partners to pay the assessments 
necessary to obtain the funds to meet those payments. (Findings, 
p. 86) . 
31. Finding: From June 27, 1980 to October 29, 1984 
approximately $1,522,000 of unduplicated funds were deposited in 
the various accounts over which Sampson had control. (Verdict, 
p. 221). It is clear from the evidence that most of the funds 
that passed through Sampson's hands were paid out on partnership 
expenses. There was no evidence in the record that Sampson ended 
up with the partnership assets and in fact the only evidence 
shows that the properties were foreclosed upon. (Verdict, pp. 
221-23) . 
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VERDICTS ENTERED BY THE COURT 
T h e d e c i s i o n o f; J u d g e C" r o f t a s t o p 1 a i n tiff's initial 
Complaint is simplistic in that it provides a judgment against 
the defendants for $19,057.42 in favor of the plaintiffs 
exc 1 ucling J i:;hn F . Sampson . (R at 23-26) . 
The decision relating to the counterclaim is essentially 
summarized on pages 233 and 234 of the decision,, The underlying 
reasoning supporting these verdicts, when it is stated in the 
document at all, is found throughout the Findings and Conclusions 
as well special section entitled "Verdict". Since these 
verdicts will be discussed extensively in the Argument portion of 
the Brief the following summary is offered for an overview of 
what the court reasoned* 
1. The court found that as to Count I Sampson violated the 
attorney-client, relationship in that he represented some of the 
defendants during 1980 but the court found that no evidence of 
damage was presented as to any of the counterclaims asserted by 
Defendants and therefore no award was given as to the First 
Count, (Findings, pp. 44-51; Conclusions, pp. 1 6 5 - 6 5 ) . 
2 . As to r t i '. n 1: 11 t h e < : o u r t: f o u n d t h at Sampson was 
negligent in the handling of various lawsuits. The court 
awarded Richins $2,027.40 for the costs incurred in setting 
aside a default judgrn*-:. • v . :. .ampson allowed to be entered 
against him- (Findings, pp. 52-3; Conclusions, pp. 165-66). 
3. The Fourth Claim for interference f^ contractual 
relationships is the heart of the court's decision relating to 
the counterclaim. As to Richins individually (A) the court found 
1 Q -
that Sampson did not interfere with Richins right to earn a 
livelihood or with anticipated opportunities for employment. 
(Findings, p. 90) . 
The court did find, however, that Sampson intentionally 
interferred with the other defendants1 existing and potential 
economic relationships with each of the limited partners under 
their respective partnership agreements- (Findings, p. 93)• 
(B) The court considered RFC to have two potential claims: 
first, as the buyer and ultimate seller of the various farms to 
the limited partnerships, and second, as a limited partner itself 
in the Richfield Farm Limited Partnership and in Catlow Valley No, 
2 and No. 6. The court concluded that even if Sampson had never 
appeared on the scene it was not probable that RFC could have 
prevented foreclosure of the original purchase contracts based 
upon the existing facts and circumstances disclosed by the 
evidence. (Verdict, pp. 228-30). The court awarded $100 
nominal damages to RFC for its interest as the seller of the farm 
property contracts. 
The court did, however, award RFC $30,974.50 for its 
interest in the Catlow Valley and Richfield Limited Partnerships. 
The court concluded that Sampson ignored its rights as limited 
partners in these partnerships, sent no notices to either, and 
offered no evidence as to what happened to the interests of the 
limited partnerships thereby causing a loss to RFC in the amount 
of their respective capital interest in those partnerships. 
(Verdict, pp. 228-30). 
(C) The remaining defendants seeking damages against 
-20-
Sampson were Richtron, Inc. and Ri chtron General which acted as 
general partners for the partnerships- Richtron, Inc. was 
awarded $4,222.50 as a limited partner in the Pleasant 
Valley Partnership on the same basis as had been given to RFC on 
its two limited partnership interests. 
In addition, however, an award of $250,000 was made in favor 
of these general partners, The court specifically rejected the 
general partners' claims for repayment of advances made to the 
limited partnerships. The court found that there was no 
preponderance of evidence to show that but for Sampsonfs efforts 
the partnerships would have in fact been solvent to pas the 
advances made by the general partners at the termination of the 
partnerships, (Findings, p. 105; Conclusions, pp. 215-16). As 
tc • the genera 1 partners1 claim for a ten percent of profits from 
the limited partnerships the court concluded that the evidentiary 
record in the case was purely speculative as to whether any 
profits would be in existence at the time of termination. 
(Findings, p. 133; Conclusions, p. 193, 204). 
The court at: the conc 1 usion of :i ts opinion made the 
following statement: 
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in 
contract, rendering liability for damages for either 
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or 
consequential for which the tortious interference is 
the legal cause. I think as to some claim for relief 
damages, of at least a consequential nature, have been 
shown with a reasonable degree of certainty by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (Verdict, p. 232). 
Thus, the award of $250,000 is based upon consequential damages 
allegedly suffered by the general partners as a result of 
Sampson's wrongful interference. 
The court rejected the affirmative defenses raised by 
Sampson including waiver and estoppel and held that the facts did 
not evidence any intent by Richins to waive his control over the 
partnership and step aside in favor of Sampson. (Conclusions, p. 
205) . 
4. The court rejected Richins request under his Fifth Claim 
for Relief that an accounting be ordered. The court stated that 
any further accounting would not add to the certainty of the 
evidence. 
5. The court also denied Richins Sixth Claim for Relief for 
an injuntion on the basis that it was not supported by any 
preponderance of the evidence and that there was nothing shown 
that could be enjoined. (Conclusions, p. 164). 
6. Defendants in their cross-appeal are seeking punitive 
damages which were denied to them by the trial court. The court 
found that Sampson in good faith attempted to negotiate 
settlement with Richins for the benefit of the limited 
partnerships (Findings, p. 140). Sampson honestly believed 
that the powers of attorney authorized him to exercise the vote 
of each partner and that he therefore legally removed the 
Richtron general partners and substituted his own PC and then 
his AG Management as general partners. Also, there was no 
direct proof that Sampson was aware of the provisions of 
§78-51-27 which rendered the acquisition of the Osborn judgment 
a violation of law even though it would not have been for anyone 
else. (Findings, p. 30, 142). 
The court found that Sampson operated the partnership under 
the power of attorney authorization until it was ruled invalid. 
At that time, however, Sampson had pi irehased the defendants' 
interest in an IRS sale and Judge Cornaby ruled on two occasions 
that the sales were valid. (Findings, p. 1 4 1 ) . 
Th e c o ii r t s t a t e d : 
One wonders what Richins thought the partnerships 
were expected to do. The Richtron general partners' 
withdrawal had left them with an uncertain future. 
Many limited partners had sought legal advice from 
Sampson and he gave it to them. The fact that he erred 
in the advice given them does not render his actions 
malicious. (Findings, p. 1 4 3 ) . 
The judgment of Judge Croft was entered on October 9, 1986. 
It is from this judgment that both plaintiff and defendants now 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The court erred in finding Sampson had tortiously 
interfered with def endants * re 1 ationshii ps with the limited 
partners, First, there was no factual evidence to show Sampson 
had the evil motive necessary to find "an improper purpose.11 
Second the "means" relied upon by the trial court were not of 
the quality necessary to justify tort liability. Also, had the 
court properly applied a "good faith standard", many of the acts 
of Sampson would not have been considered as wrongful means. 
Third, the court erred in finding causation when the facts showed 
that the relationship of defendants witli the limited partners 
would have most probably terminated with or without Sampson fs 
presence. Finally, the court should have found defendants 
waived any r i gl it to complain and are estopped from claiming 
injury. 
2. The court erred in awarding $250,000 consequential 
damages without specifically entering findings as to its 
composition. There was no evidence of consequential damages that 
the court found nor was there any presented by defendants at 
trial. Finally, the award of the capital investment as limited 
partners for Richtron and RFC was erroneous since there was no 
evidence of their values at Sampson's entry, and is unfair to the 
other limited partners. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Even a cursory review of the decision rendered by Judge 
Croft in this case shows that an extraordinary effort was made by 
the lower court in deciding the various issues presented in this 
complex lawsuit. The court, after listening to some eleven days 
of testimony and reviewing over 350 exhibits, prepared what it 
termed a "Memorandum and Summation of Evidence1' of some 178 
pages. This document attempts to summarize in chronological 
order the various events which occurred in this lawsuit. The 
court, not counsel, prepared this extensive summary of evidence. 
Utilizing this "Memorandum" the court then on its own 
initiative and with no assistance of counsel prepared the 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdicts" contained 
in Appendix II to this Brief. This document consists of 234 pages 
and is divided into a "Findings" section, a "Conclusions of Law" 
section and a "Verdict" section. Appellant Sampson appreciates 
the conscientious effort that Judge Croft made in this case and 
certainly does not complain that the case was not thoroughly 
analyzed or considered by the lower court. 
As noted earlier, Appellants1 counsel has extensively 
reviewed both the record containing the transcript evidence and 
documentary evidence with the various factual probative findings 
entered by the lower court. With only few exceptions, Appellant 
does not contest the probative findings of the lower court and 
t h e r e fore has not: r e 1 ied upon the under 1 ying record in this case 
to make the various legal arguments which will follow. Sampson 
concedes that the events chronicalled by the lower court did in 
fact occur and his only concern is focused upon the ultimate 
facts found by the lower court based upon these probative facts 
and upon conclusions of law based upon the factual findings. 
The voluminous nature of this decision creates a difficult 
problem for appellant Sampson. It is, for example, easy to 
become lost and confused in the maze of pages written by the 
lower court and to digress from the essential issues now being 
raised by Appellant. It :i s a] so difficult to reconcile all of 
the portions of the Findings in that the sheer number of findings 
create repetition and improper classification of facts as 
conclusions of law and conclusions of law as facts. Hopefully, 
Appellant will be able to sufficiently direct this Court's 
attention to those limited problems surrounding the judge's 
opinion in order to eliminate a fruitless journey into 
unnecessary issues and resolutions. 
Before proceeding into the legal arguments concerning this 
appeal it is well to summarize the various standards of review 
which apply to the issues now raised by appellant Sampson. 
First, Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure simply 
states, "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A. . . ." The lower court 
complied with this rule in the preparation of the "Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdicts" contained as Appendix 
II to this Brief. 
The secondary document entitled "Memorandum and Summation of 
Evidence" does not comply with this rule since it was intended by 
the lower court as a document to assist it in compiling the 
massive evidence presented at trial. For this reason, therefore, 
Appellant has not utilized the"Memorandum" in the preparation of 
this Brief even though the chronology of events listed therein 
are generally accurate and sequential. However, much of the 
information contained in the Memorandum is extraneous and does 
not relate to the specific Findings and Conclusions ultimately 
entered by the court as contained in Appendix II. For this 
reason, therefore, Appellant maintains that review must be 
limited solely to the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in order 
to comply with Rule 52 and the normal rules of judicial review. 
Second, in this appeal a number of separate errors are being 
asserted relating to the relationship of findings and conclusions 
of law. These principles of review are stated as follows. 
The Findings of Fact must provide a basis for determining 
whether there is a rational basis for the award of damages. 
Proper findings are essential to enable this Court to perform its 
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f unc? J •-*-• of assuring that the findings support the judgment and 
that the evidence supports the findings. Romrell v. Zions 
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Chandler v. West, 610 P . 2d 
1299 (Utah 1980) . 
Next, an appellate court does not accord any deference to 
c o n c 1 u s i o n s i> f ] a w • : f t h e t r i a 1 e o u r t s i 11 i n g w i t h o u t a jury i n 
reviewing such conclusions of law for correctness, This Court is 
as capable of determining a question of law as is the trial court 
and therefore is not bound by its conclusions. Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985); 
Automotive Mfrs. Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, 
Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). If a conclusion by the trial 
court conflicts with, or does not follow, a finding of fact made 
by the trial court, the appellate court will apply the proper 
conclusion of law. City of Raton v. Vermego Conservancy 
District, 678 P.2d 1170 (N.M, 1984). 
When findings of fact by a trial court are either so 
inconsistent or so confusing, vague or indefinite that an 
appellate court cannot determine the facts that the trial court 
intended to find, such findings are insufficient to support the 
judgment. Hawkins v. Teeples and Thatcher, Inc., 515 P 2d 
927 (Ore. 1973) . 
Findings of fact that are conclusions of law are treated as 
such on appea 1 and w:i ] ] stand on 1 y :i f there are other findings of 
fact sufficient to support them. Town Concrete Pipe of 
Washington, Inc. v. Redford, 717 P.2d 1384 (Wash. App. 1986); 
Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 660 
P.2d 973 (Kan* App. 1983), The appellate court is free to review 
without deference to the lower court findings that combine both 
facts and law when there is error as to the law. Abrams v. 
Horizon Corp., 669 P.2d 90 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
An appellate court must give great weight to the findings 
made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge but it must 
reject his findings if it considers them to be clearly erroneous. 
A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if 
the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or is induced 
by an erroneous view of the law. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191 (Utah 1987); Adair v. Bracken, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. 
App. 11-24-87) . 
The failure of the trial court to make findings on all 
material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the 
record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only 
a finding in favor of the judgment. In addition, the findings 
must indicate that the court's judgment or decree follows 
logically from, and is supported by the evidence. Also, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue is reached. Epstein v. 
Epstein, 741 P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1987). 
Finally, findings of probative facts can be used to overcome 
an express finding of the ultimate fact as where it clearly 
appears that the ultimate fact is found on] y as a conclusion from 
the particular probative facts found or the probative facts found 
are such as necessarily overcomes the finding of the ultimate 
fact. 89 C,J,S,, "Trial", §636, p, 470, 
With these principles in mind it now remains to examine the 
issues raised by Appellant in this appeal. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING SAMPSON HAD INTENTIONALLY 
INTERFERRED WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS OF 
DEFENDANTS. 
The trial court found liability against Sampson in this case 
based upon Plaintiff's Fourth Claim of Relief seeking damages for 
intentional interference of contractual and prospective 
relationships. The court recognized this theory of liability as 
enunciated :i n thi s Court! s decision of Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). The court entered 
mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the 
elements of this tort. See, Findings, pp. 93-116 and 
Conclusions, pp. 188-193. In finding liability the court 
concluded that Sampson had (1) an improper motive in his 
relationship with the limited farm partnerships; (2) that he used 
improper means in implementing his control and (3) that these 
actions caused injury to the defendants. In addition, the court 
rejected Sampson's claim of the affirmative defense of waiver on 
the part of defendants. Each of these conclusions will now be 
examined in seriatim. 
A, Sampson Neither Had an Improper Purpose 
Nor Used an Improper Means When He Assisted 
the Various Farm Limited Partnerships Which 
Had Been Created by Defendants Nor Did He 
Legally Cause Injury to Defendants. 
1. There was No Factual Finding Sufficient to Justify 
the Conclusion that Sampson had an Improper Purpose in His 
Dealings With the Limited Partnerships. 
In Leigh Furniture this Court held that the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage may 
be shown by proving an improper purpose or motive, intent or 
objective, "Because it requires that the improper purpose 
predominate, this alternative takes the long view of the 
defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short run purposes to 
be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic motivation." 567 
P.2d at 307. 
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet this Court noted that 
even when a defendant has ill will toward a plaintiff an improper 
motive will not be found if there is a proper purpose in the 
conduct. Essentially, conduct must be directed solely to the 
satisfaction of spite or ill will and not at all to the 
advancement of his competitive interest over the person harmed if 
an improper purpose is to be found. This Court observed: 
Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose 
make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated 
for the most part by the improper means alternative 
which typically requires only a showing of particular 
conduct. Id. at 307. 
In the Leigh Furniture case this Court found even 
though the plaintiff had deliberately injured the defendants1 
economic relations that thei njury was not an end in itself. 
Instead it was an intermediate step toward achieving a long-range 
financial goal of profitability by reselling the building free of 
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the defendant's interest. This Court concluded that "because 
that economic interest seems to have been controlling, we must 
conclude that the evidence in this case would not support a jury 
finding that the corporation's predominate purpose was to injure 
or ruin Isom's business merely for the sake of injury alone." 
Id. at 308. 
i its factual findings the court states the following: 
Sampson suggested from time to time that his sole 
objective was to salvage the partnerships' assets for 
the limited partners to the point of ai least getting 
back their investments. The evidence does not show 
that all investors joined in retaining Sampson as their 
attorney or their proxy, but the evidence does make 
clear that Sampson's main goal and effort soon became 
one of getting rid of Richins from all partnerships and 
obtaining control thereof for himself and his clients 
whom he never fully specifically identified. I think 
the evidence shows, and so find, that his self-declared 
benevolent motive soon changed to one of greed and a 
vendetta to oust Richins and take complete control. 
(Findings, j 115). 
Thr* court =ilso makes the st itement that Sampson interferred 
with the limited partnerships with a desire to do harm to 
defendants for his own sake, a mere officious intermeddling for 
n< jther reason than a desire to interfere and such a showing of 
facts as to establish by a preponderance of the evidence to a 
substantial degree that the improper purposes predominated any 
other purpose. Id. The court entered a conclusion of law 
essentially to the effect that the evidence preponderates in 
showing that Sampson : retentional Ly inteferred wiMi the relations 
of Defendants for an improper purpose. (Conclusions, p. 193). 
Sampson would submit that these "Findings" by the lower 
court die really conclusions of law and that a review of the 
actual probative findings in the case reveals no evidence to 
sustain the conclusion. There is no finding, for example, that 
Sampson had any relationship with Richins prior to Sampson being 
contacted by several limited partners concerning their 
investments. The lower court noted that Milton Goff and Rex 
Kohler sought Sampson's legal advice and that "their concerns 
were real and based upon the problem facts and circumstances then 
confronting Richins and his companies for which Richins, not 
Sampson, was responsible." (Findings, p. 98). 
The court also found that almost immediately upon attending 
the first meeting of limited partnerships that the limited 
partners asked Sampson to be legal counsel for them and requested 
him to take necessary steps to relieve Richtron as general 
partner and to liquidate in an orderly manner. (Findings, p. 
64). Later, Richins agreed that Sampson should hold the 
partnership funds since the limited partners did not trust 
Richins and therefore would not pay him directly. (Findings, p. 
68) . 
It is also undisputed that in May of 1980 when Sampson first 
was contacted by his clients that the partnerships were in dire 
straits financially and that a number of events seriously 
jeopardized their continuing existence. (Findings, pp. 54-64). 
In May of 1980 RFC upon the suggestion of Sampson and the other 
limited partners filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (Findings, p. 
134) . 
It is also undisputed that during the majority of 1980 
Sampson and Richins attempted to settle the interests of Richins1 
companies and that in fact a compromise agreement had been made 
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and was sent to all of the limited partners for approval. 
(Findings, pp. 68-69). This entire lawsuit would have been 
avoided had all of the limited partners agreed to the terms of 
the settlement. 
Thus, the conclusion of the trial court is not supported by 
its own factual findings. There is no question but that the 
limited parters being represented by Sampson had important 
financial interests at stake in view of the serious problems that 
had been created by Richins' "mismanagement11. (Findings, pp. 
57-64). These limited partners had a justifiable motive in 
protecting their financial interests. See, Serafino v. 
Palm Terrace Apts., Inc., 343 S.2d 851 (Fla. App. 1976); 
Restatement of Torts 2d, §769 ("The rule stated in this Section 
applies for the purpose of protecting the actor's interest. If 
his conduct is directed to that end, it is immaterial that he 
also takes a malicious delight in the harm caused by his 
action."). 
During this entire period of time when Sampson first entered 
the scene in 1980 up until 1984 Sampson maintained limited 
partnership clients who depended upon him for both legal advice 
and financial advice. Had Sampson merely advised all of the 
limited partners who had retained him to terminate their 
relationship with the defendants1 corporation, then there clearly 
could have been no finding of evil purpose. An attorney acting 
within the scope of his employment or a business advisor is 
privileged to give advice without fear of a tortious suit. 
Parker v. Gordon, 442 S.2d 273 (Fla. App. 1984); Los 
Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc., 675 P.2d 172 
(Ore. 1982) . This privilege or absence of evil motive exists 
even if the attorney or financial advisor receives a financial 
gain himself. Los Angeles Airways, Inc., supra; Lichtie 
v. U.S. Home Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Utah 1987). 
Even the court's own conclusion does not allow the finding 
of an improper motive. The fact, for example, that "Sampson's 
main goal and effort soon became one of getting rid of Richins 
from all partnerships and obtaining control thereof for himself 
and his clients" does not state an improper motive if Sampson and 
his clients believed that Richins was detrimental to the 
financial stability of the limited partnership farm operations. 
In conclusion, therefore, applying the standards adopted by 
this Court in the Leigh Furniture case the lower court erred 
in concluding an improper motive on Sampson's part when there was 
no factual findings nor evidence to justify this conclusion. 
2. The Lower Court Erred in Concluding that Sampson 
Utilized Improper Means During His Relationship With the Limited 
Partnerships. 
The court listed a number of acts which it believed 
constituted improper means as defined in the Leigh Furniture 
case. These included: (1) erroneous advice by Sampson that the 
markup charged by the defendants was a breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed to the partnership (Findings, p. 101); (2) Sampson's 
erroneous advice that the advances made by the general partners 
would not have to be repaid by the partnership (Findings, pp. 
103-105); (3) Sampson's acts of collecting money on behalf of the 
partnership (Findings, p. 105); (4) refusal of Sampson to deliver 
documents of foreclosure to Richins after requested (Findings, p. 
106); (5) wrongfully utilizing a power of attorney to substitute 
general partners (Findings, p. 107); (6) failing to properly 
amend the limited partnership certificates (Findings, p. 109); 
(7) obtaining an assignment of the Osborn judgment in violation 
of §78-51-27 (Findings, p. 109); (8) Sampson substituting his 
clients as plaintiffs in the Osborn case in violation of 
§78-51-27 (Findings, p. 110); and (9) making use of facts 
obtained while involved as an attorney-client in violation of 
ethical standards (Findings, p. 116). 
The legal conclusion of improper means is erroneous for two 
reasons: first, these acts alone or in combination are not the 
type of acts prohibited under the "improper means" standard. 
Second, the lower court failed to apply a "good faith" standard 
in determining the conduct of Sampson. 
As to this first contention this Court in Leigh 
Furniture stated that improper means is shown where the means 
used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary 
to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations or recognized 
common law rules. This Court stated, "Such acts are illegal or 
tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 'improper' means of 
interference. Examples used to illustrate this principle were 
secondary boycott, price fixing, violence, threats or other 
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded 
litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Id. at 308. 
The Restatement of Torts requires the means used to be "innately 
wrongful, or predatory in character." Restatement of Torts 2d, 
§766A, Comment e, p. 19 (1979). 
Appellant submits that the listed items by the lower court 
do not fit this category of "improper means" since they involve 
conduct which is not itself predatory or tortious and generally 
involve errors in judgment or technical legal violations. 
Second, the lower court failed to consider Sampson's good 
faith efforts in undertaking a majority of the actions which the 
lower court listed. For example, the court noted that Sampson in 
giving legal advice as to the markup and the advances believed 
that he was giving the right legal opinion but stated that his 
belief did not make it so and therefore was a factor to be 
considered in determining tort liability. (Conclusions, pp. 
172-73). 
Likewise, the court found that Sampson honestly believed 
that the powers of attorney authorized him to exercise the vote 
of each partner that signed the power and returned it to him 
thereby authorizing him by majority vote to remove the general 
partners and substitute his own PC. "What Sampson did he, in my 
opinion, did believing in the validity of his own stand." 
(Findings, p. 80). Likewise, "there was no direct proof that 
Sampson was aware of the provisions of §78-51-27, which rendered 
his acquisition of the Osborn judgment, as a lawyer, a serious 
violation of law." Id. 
Likewise, the court found that at all times Sampson believed 
because of one circumstance or another that he had authority to 
operate as the general partner on behalf of the limited 
partnerships. The court stated: 
For almost six months he worked amicably with 
Richins on settlement. When that failed, by powers of 
attorney he got proxies to vote the limited partners' 
interest- He did so, alleging his PC a general 
partner. When that was said to be contrary to law, he 
voted AG Management in as the general partner and so 
operated. By the time Judge Palmer ruled that illegal, 
Sampson was able to carry on under a color of authority 
by receipt of an IRS certificate of sale, followed by 
two favorable rulings by Judge Cornaby until the IRS 
sale was voided in May of 1984 by a federal court 
order. (Conclusions, p. 143). 
In Hill v. Kansas City Star Co., 719 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 
App. 1986) a suit was brought against a newspaper for allegedly 
tortiously interfering with the contract or a newspaper vendor. 
The newspaper terminated a contract on the basis of a report that 
the vendor had been vandalizing vending machines of the 
newspaper. The court in ruling in favor of the newspaper held 
that the question was not whether or not the vendor had committed 
the vandalism but whether the newspaper had acted in good faith 
in believing the report that such vandalism occurred. Whether 
the report was mistaken or not was irrelevant. 
Similarly, in Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327 (N.D. 
1987) the appellate court reversed the lower court and held that 
whether a mayor acted in good faith as to information he had 
about an employee was relevant in determining whether a 
termination was improper under a suit for tortious interference. 
In GM Ambulance v. Canyon State Ambulance, 739 P.2d 203 
(Ariz. App. 1987) an ambulance company brought suit to enjoin a 
competitor from operating in its territory. The court stated 
that the ambulance competitor had violated a statute prohibiting 
such competition. The court referred to this Court's decision in 
Leigh Furniture and noted that improper conduct gives rise 
to liability. The court stated, however: 
We believe, however, that Canyon State's violation 
of the statute is outweighed by the good faith reliance 
on the letter. Canyon State relied on the opinion of 
the very department charged with regulating its 
conduct. Under such circumstances we do not believe 
that it acted improperly so as to subject itself to 
liability for the tort of interference with contract. 
Id. at 205. 
In Institutional Food v. Golden State Strawberries, 537 
F. Supp. 1105 (D. Mo. 1983) the court noted that it is not 
necessarily whether a particular fact exists or does not exist at 
the time an interference allegedly occurrs. Instead, it is the 
good faith belief of the party at the time in taking its course 
of action. To find liability there must be a showing that the 
defendant acted maliciously, in bad faith, without any reasonable 
basis for believing in the merit of its claim justifying its 
course of action. 
Finally, in American Petrofina, Inc. v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 740 (App. Tex. 1984) the court ruled that the 
defendant had improperly interpreted a contract upon which it 
based its alleged interference. The court in finding no 
liability stated: 
There is no evidence that Fina acted under 
anything other than a good faith belief that it was not 
required to deliver oil which had trippled in value 
over four years of inactivity in a transaction which 
contemplated frequent purchases and use of the oil at 
the prevailing rates. Although the trial court found, 
and this court concurs, that the two contracts are to 
be construed together, we cannot say that Fina could 
not have had the conviction that it was bound only by 
the provisions of its contract with its distributor. 
. . Complete innocence and perfect good faith might 
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very well be the basis of the justification which 
constitutes a defense to a claim for tortious 
interference with a contract. Id. at 758-59. 
Here, the court in its Findings relied upon the Leigh 
decision in which this Court stated: 
Even in small groups, these acts might be 
explained as merely instances of aggressive or 
abrasive—though not illegal or tortious—tactics, 
excesses that occur in contractual and commercial 
relationships. But in total and in cumulative effect, 
as a course of action extending over a period of three 
and one half years and culminating in the failure of 
Isom's business, the Leigh Corporation's acts crossed 
the threshhold beyond what is incidental and 
justifiable to what is tortious. 657 P.2d at 306. 
See the Court's reference to "crossing the threshhold" at pp. 
94 and 114 of Findings. 
Since the lower court obviously applied the strict letter of 
the law to the acts of Sampson and failed to consider any element 
of good faith it is impossible to say whether these series of 
events relied upon by the lower court to find an improper means 
would have been sufficient had a majority of them been 
negated by Sampsonfs conceded good faith belief. In other words, 
if a person believes he is complying with the laws of limited 
partnership, believes that he is interpreting a limited 
partnership agreement correctly, and believes that he has legal 
authority to act as a general partner then such actions are not 
"illegal means" under the Leigh Furniture case even though 
it is later determined that these actions are all legally 
invalid because of various legal interpretations made by 
subsequent court decisions. 
For these reasons, therefore, the Findings of the lower 
court did not justify the conclusion of improper means in that 
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the listed acts did not rise to the level required of predatory 
acts and second, the lower court incorrectly failed to apply a 
good faith standard in determining these acts. 
3• The Lower Court Erred in Concluding that the Actions 
of Sampson Caused Injury to the Defendants. 
In order to recover damages for an intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations it is required that the 
plaintiff prove that the defendant caused injury to the 
plaintiff. 657 P.2d at 304. The court entered a finding that 
"Sampson by his tortious conduct caused injury to the 
defendants." The court noted that it does not appear that Richins 
"ever gained actual control over any of the partnerships after 
[the end of 1980] even though he successfully reversed Sampsonfs 
tactics in state and federal courts." (Findings, pp. 116-17). 
The court also entered a conclusion of law that based upon the 
summary of facts as contained in Findings 96 and 97 that Sampson 
caused injury to the defendants. (Conclusions, p. 193). 
This finding of injury is inconsistent with other findings 
of the court which negate such causation. First, the court 
correctly noted that the limited partnership agreement in this 
case could be terminated by either the limited partners or the 
general partners at will. (Conclusions, p. 209). 
Next, the court in a series of findings observed the 
financial instability of the limited partnerships at the time 
Sampson first became involved. The court noted that as of May 
1980 the evidence suggested a bleak outlook for the future of the 
limited partnership operations. (Findings, p. 54). The court 
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stated, "As stated in prior findings, by May, 1980, Richins and 
his companies had become confronted with substantial financial 
problems, as well as others likewise mentioned elsewhere, which 
were of such magnitude that success in overcoming them seemed 
doubtful." (Findings, p. 97). 
In another finding the court stated, "There is in fact, no 
assurance, even disregarding the problems defendants and the 
partnerships were confronted with in May, 1980, that in the end 
after final sale of the properties that there would be profits 
remaining to be so divided." (Findings, p. 134). 
In a conclusion the court stated: 
If adjusted for prior payments made by the 
partnerships to RFC, it would probably reflect a total 
markup which amount could be used as a measure of 
damages only if defendants could prove that but for 
Sampson's conduct, all partnership contracts would have 
been paid off in full. This they have not done and 
could not have done. (Conclusions, p. 197). 
In another area the court stated: 
Even if a true value of RFC's equity in each 
partnership property under its resale contract could be 
established, circumstances existing in May 1980, 
created a strong probability that some, if not all, of 
such contracts would never be paid out. (Verdict, 
p. 224). 
Finally, in the conclusion of the Verdict section the court 
says: 
Even if Sampson had never appeared on the scene, 
it does not appear probable that Richins and RFC would 
have prevented foreclosure of the original purchase 
contracts, based upon the existing facts and 
circumstances. (Verdict, pp. 230-31). 
These inconsistent findings will now be analyzed in terms of 
case law. An interest in a contract terminable at will is 
primarily an interest in future relations between the parties 
since the parties have no legal assurance of the continuing 
relationship. Kelly v. St. Vincent Hospital, 692 P.2d 1350 (N.M. 
1984). A contract which is "at will" gives either party the 
absolute right to withdraw from the obligation at any time. 
Levin v. Cuhn Loeb & Co., 417 A.2d 79 (N.J. 1980). 
Thus, under the terms of all of these limited partnership 
farm agreements the limited partners were free at any time to 
terminate their relations with the defendants or some of the 
defendants by either dissolving the partnership altogether or by 
electing a new general partner to take the defendants' place. 
There was no "right" for the defendants to continue their control 
over the limited partnerships in the future. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Tri-Continental Leasing 
Co. v. Neidhardt, 540 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App. 1976) stated the 
correct rule for analysis as to causation in tortious 
interference cases. The court stated that "to establish 
liability in a tortious interference with contract case, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant's acts caused the breach." 
The court then stated: 
In determining whether the defendant's acts were a 
"moving cause" in the breach, courts apply what is 
essentially a "but for" test of causation. (Citations 
omitted). The rule presupposes that the party 
defaulting was ready, able and willing to perform and 
would have done so if it had not been prevented or 
persuaded by the malicious and unwarranted interference 
of a third party. Id. at 216. 
The court observed that a plaintiff must show that a defendant 
actively and affirmatively took steps to induce a breach but that 
this factor alone is not sufficient to establish liability. 
"There must be an additional showing that the defendant's 
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affirmative conduct caused the breach—that had it not been for 
the defendant's acts, the contract would have been 
performed." Id. at 216. 
The court in that case found that there was no evidence, 
direct or circumstantial that would permit the jury to find 
without resort to speculation or conjecture that the third party 
would have performed the contract "but for" the actions of the 
defendant. Because a jury cannot resort to such speculation and 
conjecture, the appellate court affirmed a motion for directed 
verdict granted by the lower court overturning a jury verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico made a similar decision. In 
Anderson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1981) the 
court stated: 
It is a basic rule that the defendant must be 
shown to have caused the interference. We cannot 
uphold a claim for interference with prospective 
contractual relations where it is not clear that the 
plaintiff himself has not caused the interference. 
Where the claim is based on an indirect interference 
such as that alleged here, the plaintiff must clearly 
show that his own action or inaction did not constitute 
interference. In other words, Anderson must prove that 
there was an actual prospective contractual relation 
which, but for the insurer's interference, would have 
been consummated. This Anderson has failed to show. 
Id. at 841. 
In Levin v. Cuhn Loeb & Co., 417 A.2d 79, 85 (N.J. 
Super. 1980) the court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant when it found that viewing the evidence most 
favorably to the plaintiff there was no showing that the 
plaintiff would have continued his contractual relation but for 
the conduct of the defendant. The court cited authority which 
stated "there must be some certainty that the plaintiff would 
have gotten the contract but for the fraud. This cannot be left 
to surmise or speculation." Id. See also, Special 
Event Entertainment v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 72 
(D.N.Y. 1978). ("The pleadings themselves reveal that the Radio 
City defendants were not disposed toward honoring their alleged 
commitment even before the state defendants entered the 
negotiations."). 
The Findings of the Court show that the limited partners 
were already fleeing a sinking ship before Sampson entered the 
picture. The partnerships were in foreclosure proceedings, the 
IRS had attached defendants1 assets for failure to pay taxes and 
RFC was in bankruptcy. To conclude that the limited partners 
would have remained with defendants "but for" Sampson's 
interference is pure speculation and against the weight of the 
court's own factual findings. 
B. The Lower Court Erred in Concluding That 
The Affirmative Defenses of Waiver and Estoppel 
Were Not Applicable to the Defendants in This 
Case. 
The court specifically found that there were not sufficient 
facts to establish either estoppel or waiver as against the 
defendants. (Findings, pp. 145-50). The court also entered the 
following Conclusion: 
As to the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver 
and laches, it is my opinion that Sampson did not prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Richins1 
actions at any time induced Sampson to believe certain 
facts existed that lead to Sampson's detriment; or by 
his actions evince in any unequivocable manner an 
intent to waive his control over the partnerships and 
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step aside in favor of Sampson; nor did Richins' 
actions at any time constitute a lack of diligence 
which brought injury to Sampson; and I so conclude. 
(Conclusions, p. 205). 
Sampson submits that this legal conclusion is not supported 
by the factual findings of the court. The court found, for 
example, that as early as June 9, 1980 Sampson told the members 
of the Blackfoot Limited Partnership that he was withdrawing as 
general partner and told them to find a more compatible one. On 
June 10 he filed a formal notice withdrawing and on June 11 he 
wrote three other similar letters withdrawing. (Findings, pp. 
67-68). 
On June 2 and June 5, Richins without advising any investor 
or partnership, executed quit claim deeds purporting to convey 
all of the partnership properties from the limited partnerships 
to RFC. (Findings, p. 65). The deeds were recorded in December 
1980 and January 1981. 
On November 13 Richins executed a notice of withdrawal of 
the general partner to six other limited partnerships. By 
January 6, 1981 he had sent identical notices to eighteen other 
partnerships. (Findings, p. 69). While stating that the 
partnerships would be wound up immediately Richins undertook no 
effort to wind up the partnerships after notice was given. 
(Findings, p. 64). 
In a conclusion of law the court stated: 
The Richtron.general partners, even after 
withdrawal, had the duty and obligation under the law 
to wind up the partnership affairs and terminate the 
partnership, when there had been no valid exercise of 
the partners' right to remove by majority vote the 
general partner and elect a new one. Richins 
continuously challenged the validity of Sampson's 
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actions with respect to installing a new general 
partner, yet delayed in seeking help from the court to 
rule on his challenge when prompt action seemed 
indicated. (Conclusions, p. 204). 
In the Verdict portion of the opinion the court made this 
finding: 
Finally, and of great importance, was Richins1 
failure to himself undertake efforts to wind up 
partnership affairs and bring about dissolution and 
termination with any resulting benefits to all 
concerned. The courts were there to help him to do so 
but he never used them for that purpose. I recall that 
in the Blackstone suit against defendants, they 
counterclaimed seeking dissolution; but when Judge 
Palmer ruled in their favor that AG Management was not 
legally elected general partner, any further effort in 
that case on their counterclaim was not brought out in 
this trial. Even in the case at bar, Richins did not 
seek a windup and dissolution by this Court. (Verdict, 
p. 229). 
Finally, the court observed in its findings that after 
Sampson had obtained the power of attorneys and remained in 
control of the limited partnerships Richins did nothing for two 
years before obtaining a summary judgment that the transfer was 
invalid. In addition, Richins after obtaining the invalidation 
of the IRS sale in May of 1984 waited until January 5, 1985 
before requesting Judge Cornaby to vacate the prior orders. 
(Findings, pp. 140-41). 
It requires no legal citation that the principles of waiver 
and estoppel should be applied in this case. Essentially, 
Richins voluntarily withdrew as general partner in all of the 
limited partnerships. It is hard to imagine what act could be 
considered more of a waiver of rights to continue as the general 
partner than the notices of withdrawal. In addition, Richins did 
nothing to wind up the affairs of the corporation or to seek 
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court relief in obtaining orders allowing a winding up. Sampson 
and the limited partners were essentially left on a course of 
their own with all of the Richins financial problems still on 
board the sinking partnership vessel. Finally, Richins allowed 
this conduct to continue for over two years before finally 
obtaining a court order invalidating Sampson's authority. 
The lower court should have found in favor of Sampson as to 
these defenses which under the terms of tortious interference 
would have negated any improper purpose or improper means which 
the court attributed to Sampson. 
In conclusion, therefore, the lower court erred in finding 
an improper purpose, an improper means, in finding causation of 
injury, and in not finding in favor of the affirmative defenses. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS. 
The question as to damages only becomes relevant to this 
appeal if this Court rejects the previous contentions of 
Appellant relating to the finding of liability. As an alternate 
grounds for appeal, therefore, Sampson maintains that the lower 
court erred in its award of damages to the defendants. 
Specifically, the court erred in awarding $250,000 in favor of 
Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General against Sampson as 
consequential damages and an award in favor of RFC against 
Sampson for $30,974.50 and Richtron against Sampson for $4,222.50 
which represents their equity amounts as limited partners. Both 
of these objections will now be discussed. 
A. The Factual Findings of the Lower Court Do Not 
-/IT — 
Justify the Imposition of $250,000 as Consequential 
Damages . 
As noted earlier, it is essential that a trial court enter 
adequate findings as to damages in order to justify the decision 
and to allow appellate review. In the instant case the lower 
court failed to adhere to this requirement. It is submitted that 
anyone reading the 234 page opinion of Judge Croft would believe 
that no substantial damages had been awarded to the defendants 
against Sampson until the very last page of the opinion is read. 
In other words, the $250,000 figure appears like a phantom in the 
night. There is no previous reference to this amount in either 
the Findings, Conclusions, or Verdict. 
This inadequacy was stated to the judge during oral 
argument on motions to amend the findings. Sampson's trial 
counsel made the following statement to the lower court: 
In Objection No. 5, Your Honor, the court in 
finding 232 acknowledges that there are damages of a 
consequential nature and then, however, the Court does 
not go on with any to identify what damages the Court 
is referring what evidence supports that particular 
statement, then the Court goes on and awards the 
$250,000 in favor of the general partners and against 
Mr. Sampson. As we have outlined here on page 5, I 
think the Court walked through all the various 
theories, and then the Court dispelled most of these 
theories, and I guess our position is we don't have any 
idea, Your Honor, where the $250,000 comes from. 
(Transcript Hearing of September 11, 1987, p. 26). 
The statement by Sampson's attorney is correct. An 
examination of the opinion of Judge Croft essentially rejects 
every damage contention of the defendants with minor exceptions. 
The court found that as to the attorney-client fiduciary breach 
there was evidence of liability but no damages had been proven. 
(Findings, pp. 44-51; Conclusions, p. 165). As to the Count II 
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claim of negligent handling of lawsuits the court awarded Richins 
as an individual $2,027.40 for the cost incurred in setting aside 
a default judgment. (Findings, pp. 52-53; Conclusions, pp. 
165-66). The only other awards of damages was $30,974.50 to RFC 
for its interest in the Catlow Valley and Richfield Limited 
Partnerships and $4,222.50 to Richtron for its limited 
partnership interest in the Pleasant Valley Partnership. Both of 
these awards will be discussed in the following section. 
Thus, as to the Fourth Claim relating to tortious 
interference no award was made with the exception of the $250,000 
to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General and $100 to RFC. Richins' 
individual claims were denied on the basis he did not prove any 
interference with his own personal right to earn a livelihood. 
(Findings, p. 90). As to RFC the court concluded that its only 
claim to damages was as the seller of the farm properties to the 
various limited partnerships. The court reasoned that even if 
Sampson had never appeared on the scene it was not probable that 
RFC could have prevented foreclosure of the original purchase 
contracts based upon the existing facts and circumstances 
disclosed by the evidence. (Verdict, pp. 228-30). This was 
especially true since FRC was in bankruptcy at the time Sampson 
first came into the partnership affairs. (Verdict, p. 226). 
The court awarded $100.00 as nominal damages. 
As to the two general partners the court specifically 
rejected each of the requested items of damages. First, it 
rejected the defendants' claim for repayment of advances made to 
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the limited partnership on the basis that there was no 
preponderance of evidence to show that but for Sampson's efforts 
the partnerships would have in fact been solvent to pay the 
advances made by the general partners at the termination of the 
partnerships, (Findings, p. 105; Conclusions, pp. 215-16). As 
to the general partners1 claim for a ten percent of profits from 
the limited partnerships the court concluded that the evidentiary 
record in the case was purely speculative as to whether any 
profits would be in existence at the time of termination and 
therefore no damages could be awarded. (Findings, p. 133; 
Conclusions, pp. 198, 204). 
The court reviewed the various pieces of evidence offered by 
the defendants to show loss of equity positions or profits. 
(Findings, pp. 124-37). The court entered Conclusions of Law 
that any attempt to prove profits or equity was too speculative 
and that the evidence offered by the defendants was not credible. 
(Conclusions, pp. 198-205). Finally, in the "Verdict" portion of 
the opinion the court once again went through its reasoning as to 
all of the defendants and all of the claims. (Verdict, pp. 
209-32). 
The court noted, for example, that by May of 1980 Richins 
had so mismanaged the partnership affairs that they did not have 
funds to pay installments owed RFC so that RFC could not pay its 
installment obligations to the contract sellers. (Verdict, p. 
229). The court stated that it was the problems created by 
Richins1 mismanagement followed by Sampson's tortious conduct 
that brought this case to court for a decision as to whether any 
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damages were recoverable upon the counterclaim. The court stated 
that even though the partnerships were floundering Sampson sought 
value and spent six years in running it leaving Richins with no 
tangible asset or value, (Verdict, p. 231), 
The only explanation for the $250,000 judgment has to be 
contained on Page 232, two pages before the decision ends. The 
court said: 
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in 
contract, rendering liability for damages for either 
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or 
consequential for which the tortious interference is 
the legal cause. I think as to some claim for relief 
damages, of at least a consequential nature, have been 
shown with a reasonable degree of certainty by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (Verdict, p. 232). 
The only other indication giving any enlightenment as to the 
composition of the $250,000 figure is seen in the court's oral 
colloquy with Sampson's trial counsel during the hearing to amend 
the findings. A copy of this portion of the transcript is 
contained in Appendix I of this Brief. The lower court basically 
took the position that the $250,000 figure was analogous to a 
jury bringing in a $25,000 figure in a $100,000 suit. (Tr. p. 
26). The court stated that he was not obligated to say what the 
$250,000 is made up of. (Tr. p. 31). The court stated that 
"recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships. It was a 
tort just like you run a red light and crash into your car. I 
commit a tort and you're injured. And you are entitled to 
recover damages. But how much? Well, the jury says $25,000. 
You wanted $100,000. You get $25,000, you see." (Tr. p. 28). 
The court concluded by saying that in no sense of the word 
could he give Richins $5 million, $6 million, $9 million, or $12 
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million as he requested because the evidence wasn't there. The 
$250,000 is just the amount the court came up with. He is not, 
according to the court, required to break it down into advances 
not recovered, improper expenditure of attorneys' fees by Sampson 
or overhead expenses. (Tr. p. 31). 
A brief review of case law concerning damages will support 
Sampson's contention that the award of $250,000 without any 
evidentiary basis was error. In Robinson v. Herinson, 409 
P.2d 121 (Utah 1965) this Court stated the rule that no award of 
damages should be based upon mere speculation or conjecture. 
There must be firm foundation for any award of damages by proof 
that is at least more probable than not that damages have been 
suffered. See also, Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread 
Co., 504 P.2d 40 (Utah 1972). 
More recently, this Court stated: 
It is true that some degree of uncertainty in the 
evidence of damages will not relieve a defendant from 
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. However, it is also 
a general rule of long standing that a plaintiff must 
show damages by evidence of fact and not by mere 
conclusion, and that the items of damage must be 
established by substantial evidence and not by 
conjecture. And, whether general or special, damages 
must be traceable to the wrongs complained of. 
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 
683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984). 
By its very definition"consequential" damages must be 
analogous to special damages. This Court noted the distinction 
between general and special damages by stating: 
General damages are those which naturally and 
necessarily result from the harm done. They are 
damages which everybody knows are likely to result from 
the harm described and so are said to be implied in 
law. Special damages are those which occur as a 
natural consequence of the harm done but are not 
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so certain to flow therefrom as to be implied in law. 
One claiming them must plead them so as to let his 
adversary know what will be involved. (Emphasis 
added). Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 
307 (Utah 1975). (Emphasis added). 
The court in describing these distinctions used the 
following illustration: 
Plaintiff sues defendant for blowing up his dam 
in the river and claimed damages in the amount of 
$5,000. His proof shows the cost of repairs to the dam 
to be $1,000. He offers evidence to the effect that he 
had a water mill which had to be shut down for two 
months during the rebuilding of the dam and that he 
lost profits in the amount of $4,000 as a result 
thereof. The rebuilding of the dam is an item of 
general damages, but the loss of profits due to 
inoperation of the mill is an item of special damage 
because it is peculiar to his case. 
Another man might have his dam blown up and might 
not even own a mill, or it might not be operative. 
Still another man might have special damages because he 
could not irrigate his farm as a result of the 
destruction of the dam which he owned and the lowering 
of the water below the bottom of his lateral ditch. 
Each dam owner would need to set forth his particular 
special damages because such special damages do not of 
necessity follow as a result of the tort. Id. at 
307. See also, Prince v. Peterson, 533 P.2d 
1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). 
The lower court essentially held that all of the claimed 
damage theories of defendant could not be sustained because of 
their speculative nature. He rejected the general partners' 
claim for advances, for lost profits, and for management fees. 
He then, however, concluded that consequential damages was of the 
nature of a general damage and that an amount could be awarded 
without any explanation just as if a jury were awarding damages 
for pain and suffering to an injured plaintiff. 
This reasoning is clearly erroneous since in order to 
determine whether a damage is "legally caused" by the actions of 
the defendants it is necessary to know both the amount and the 
source of claimed injury. Under §774A of the Restatement of 
Torts "consequential losses for which the interference is the 
legal cause may be awarded." Without specific amounts and 
sources the "legal cause" could never be reviewed by an appellate 
court. 
Besides the deficiency in the court's Findings and 
Conclusions there is simply no evidence listed by the court that 
would in any way constitute consequential damages giving rise to 
any award. The defendants simply did not plead or produce such 
evidence since their damage theories were based upon other claims 
which were all summarily rejected by the court. 
For this reason, therefore, the award of $250,000 damages to 
the two general partners should be vacated. 
B. The Lower Court Erred in Awarding Damages 
to Richtron, Inc. and to RFC for Their 
Respective Limited Partnership Interests In 
Several Farm Properties. 
The court awarded $30,974.50 in favor of RFC and against the 
plaintiff Sampson for its limited partnership interest in 
Richfield Farms and Catlow Valley Farms Nos. 2 and 6. It awarded 
Richtron, Inc. $4,222.50 for its limited partnership interest in 
the Pleasant Valley Farm. (Verdict, pp. 233-34) . The reasoning 
behind these awards is contained in the court's Verdict where it 
said that Sampson "ignored [their] rights as such limited 
partners, sent no notices to either, offered no evidence as to 
what in fact happened to the interests of the Pleasant Valley, 
Richfield and Catlow Valley Limited Partners, and thereby caused 
a loss to RFC and Richtron, Inc. in the amount of their 
respective capital interest in those partnerships. (Verdict, p. 
230) . 
Essentially, the lower court awarded both RFC and Richtron, 
Inc. their original capital shares as limited partners in all of 
these farm limited partnerships. This was done with no showing 
by the plaintiffs that at the time Sampson took over the 
operation of the partnerships that their original capital 
contributions had the same value as when they were initially 
contributed. Consider, for example, that the Catlow 
Valley Partnership was in foreclosure and that Richins in 
May of 1980 stated that an additional $240,000 had to be 
raised to save the property. (Findings, p. 63). 
Plaintiffs produced no evidence and the courts made no 
findings that the ignoring of the rights or the failure to send 
notices to either of them substantially affected their 
partnership interests. In other words, their interests were no 
different than any of the other limited partners in the farm 
properties and they were entitled to no more than what their 
interests were worth at the time of the alleged interference. 
Further, it should be noted that the designated general 
partner of each of these limited partnerships to which awards 
were granted was one of Richins1 corporate entities. Thus, when 
Richins sent out notices of withdrawal as to the general partner 
he could have at that point wound up the affairs of these 
partnerships properly and distributed their shares at such time. 
Instead, he did nothing during the course of the years and 
allowed Sampson to continue acting as general partner. Thus, any 
interest in those limited partnerships again was essentially 
waived by Richins when he failed to take action to preserve the 
capital interests of each entity. In view of the fact that the 
lower court found that all of these farms had been ultimately 
foreclosed upon by their owners and that RFC was in bankruptcy it 
was unreasonable to award Richtron, Inc. and RFC their entire 
initial capital investment when the evidence clearly showed that 
such investment had been forfeited, or at least substantially 
reduced. 
For these reasons, therefore, the award of damages as stated 
above should also be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court should be reversed and 
judgment entered on behalf of defendant Sampson. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of December, 1987. 
Craig 3\ ' Cook 
Attorned for Appellant 
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John T. Anderson, Esq., Utah State Bar No. 94 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Suite 600, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)532-7520 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JOHN P. SAMPSON and MILTON R. 
GOFF, individually, and as 
trustee of Milton R. Goff 
Trust, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
RICHTRON FINANCIAL CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation; 
RICHTRON GENERAL, a Utah 
corporation, and, 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 29552 
-ooOoo-
The counterclaim of defendants, Richtron, Inc., Richtron General, Richtron 
Financial Corporation and Paul H. Richins (collectively, "Counterplaintiffs"), 
came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Court 
Judge, between January 27, 1986 and February 11, 1986. Counterplaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel, John T. Anderson of Hansen & Anderson. 
Counterdefendants, John P. Sampson and Milton R. Goff, trustee, were 
represented by their counsel, Christopher L. Burton and Paul M. Harman of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The court having heard and considered the 
arguments, representations and statements of counsel and the testimony of 
witnesses; having read and considered the complete file of pleadings and papers 
and exhibits in this case; having made and entered its memorandum and 
summation of evidence; having made and entered its original and amended findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and verdicts; and good cause appearing therefor, 
the court hereby enters judgment on Counterplaintiffs1 counterclaim as follows: 
1. Counterplaintiff, Paul H. Richins, shall be, and he hereby is, granted 
judgment against counterdefendant, John Pe Sampson, for the sum of $2,027.40. 
2. Counterdefendant, Milton R. Goff, trustee, shall be, and he hereby 
is, granted judgment of no cause of action on Richins' individual claims against 
Milton R. Goff, trustee. 
3. Counterplaintiff, Richtron Financial Corporation, shall be, and it 
hereby is, granted judgment against counterdefendant, John P. Sampson, in the 
sum of $31,074.50. 
4. Counterplaintiff, Richtron, Inc., shall be, and it hereby is, granted 
judgment against counterdefendant, John P. Sampson, in the amount of 
$4 222.50. n • i i n £>**' / 
5. Counterplaintiff^ Richtron General, shall be, andA% hereby i|£ 
granted judgment against counterdefendant, John P. Sampson, in the sum of 
$250,000.00. 
6. Counterdefendants, Milton R4 Goff, trustee for Virgil R. Condon, 
Paul D. Hubert, O&M Plumbing & Heating Company, Earl V. Gritton, Phillip R. 
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Boyer, Toffe Sawaya and Russell Smuin, shall be, and they herebv are, granted 
judgment of no cause of action on all claims***^ ?t*us 0>rU<ZuiMz£++~*^ * 
7. Counter defendant, John P. Sampson, shall be, and he hereby is, 
granted judgment of no cause of action against defendants on their claims for 
injunctive relief and an accounting.fop the reason that the accounting infoi»maticjrr 
pgnvitied by Counterplaintiff; Paul Hi IUL1UIU>,*L i>uffiei<iJiU-
8. Counterplaintiffs shall be, and they hereby are, granted judgment 
against counter defendant, John P. Sampson, for costs in the sum of $1,625.80. 
9. Interest shall accrue on the foregoing sums at the rate of 12% per 
annum from the date of entry hereof until the date of payment. 
DATED this *2f day of September, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
drM - C^6tr 
orable Bryant K. Croft "J 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Bv 
John T. Anderson (y^&ft W-STfajWA 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By \ 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In re: 
Complaint of 
Paul H. Richins and 
Richtron Cnmoanies 
against 
John P. Sampson 
Respondent 
DOB - 10/15/39 ] 
Admission - 12/26/68 
PRIVATE REPRIMAND 
I Case No. 4-83-5-0080 
The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar, 
having conducted its investigation into charges of unethical 
conduct brought against John P. Sampson by Paul H. Richins and 
certain Richtron Companies, and a Screening Panel of the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee having met and considered written 
submissions and oral presentations of the parties, now renders 
its Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation as follows? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Beginning in 1980, Mr. Sampson undertook the representa-
tion of certain limited partners in limited partnerships 
organized by Mr. Richins. 
2. On behalf of the limited partners, Mr. Sampson 
attempted to work out settlements with Mr. Richins and the 
Richtron Companies. 
3. In connection with the settlements, Mr. Sampson 
sought to protect the interests of his limited partner clients 
by appearing in certain suits on behalf of Richins and certain 
of the Richtron Companies. 
4. Mr. Sampson failed to make clear to Mr. Richins and 
the Richtron Companies that his involvement in the suits was 
solely to protect the interests of his limited partner clients. 
5. Mr. Sampson's appearance in certain cases on behalf 
of Mr. Richins and Richtron Companies created a technical 
conflict of interest. 
6. Mr. Sampson received money on behalf of his limited 
partner clients and disbursed it pursuant to their general 
instructions, and did not hold money belonging to the limited 
partnerships, Mr. Richins or the Richtron Companies. 
7. Mr. Sampson was careless in documenting trust fund 
expenditures and in accounting to his clients. 
8. Mr. Sampson was careless in documenting disbursements 
to himself from the trust funds and for payment of legal fees 
and expenses. 
9. Mr. Sampson comingled client funds held in his trust 
account with his private funds for the purpose of protecting 
his private funds from judicial levy. 
10. MTe Sampson purchased, on behalf of limited partner-
ship clients, and for their benefit, a judgment in favor of 
Mr* Osborne and against Richins and two Richtron Companies, 
but took assignment of the judgment in his own name in violation 
of § 78-51-27, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
11. Many of the allegations made by complainants are not 
related to ethical misconduct, and resolution of those issues 
should be left to the civil courts. 
12. Mr. Sampson defended on the ground that he did not 
represent Mr. Richins and the Richtron Companies and that he 
acted at all times in the interest of and under the direction 
of his limited partner clients. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Sampson violated Canon 9, DR 9-101s A lawyer shall 
avoid even the appearance of impropriety; and Canon 5, DR 5-105(B): 
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment, in appearing in 
suits on behalf of Mr. Richins and Richtron Companies. 
2. Mr. Sampson violated Canon 9, DR 9-102(A); All funds 
of clients paid to a lawyer shall be deposited in identifiable 
bank accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer shall be 
deposited therein, by the comingling of funds. 
3. Mr. Sampson violated Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5): A lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice, for his actions in connection with the assignment 
of the Osborne judgment. 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar, 
pursuant to Rule VII(e) and Rule IX(1)(D) of the Procedures of 
Discipline, recommends to the Board of Bar Commissioners that 
John P. Sampson be privately reprimanded for professional 
misconduct as above described. In making this recommendation, 
the Committee took into account its belief that there was no 
dishonesty, deceit or bad motive in Mr. Sampson's conduct, and 
that he was at all times acting in the interest of his limited 
partner clients.
 /— N 
Ellen M. Maycock 
ORDER OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
Upon the recommendation of the Committee on Ethics and 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, the Board of Commissioners 
hereby privately reprimands John P. Sampson for professional 
misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar of this state. 
DATED this &> t day of )j>u^<Ly , > 1987. 
BOARD^ -OF COMMISSIONERS 
4^ . ~DartT President 
COPY OF TRANSCRIPT HEARING ON SEPT. 11, 1986 
Pages 26-31 
MR, HARMON: 
In Objection No. 5, Your Honor, the Court in finding 232 
acknowledges that there are damages of a consequential nature and 
then, however, the Court does not go on with any to identify what 
damages the Court is referring what evidence supports that 
particular statement, and then the Court goes on and awards the 
$250,000 in favor of the general partners and against Mr. 
Sampson. As we have outlined here on page 5, I think the Court 
walked through all the various theories, and then the Court 
dispelled most of these theories, and I guess our position is we 
don't have any idea, Your Honor, where the $250,000 comes from. 
THE COURT: 
Do you have any idea when a jury comes in with a verdict for 
$25,000 in a $100,000 as to where it got that figure? I have 
seen that hundreds of times in trials that I have presided over. 
You don't know how they have arrived at those figures, 
generally. 
I gave considerable thought to this problem. It was, I 
guess, one of my major things that I wrestled with. There wasn't 
any doubt in my mind based upon the record made during the trial 
that John Sampson had intentionally interferred with an existing 
economic relationship, and that all of the elements, both the 
means and the manner that were spelled out by our Supreme Court 
as constituting elements of that particular tort to me were 
clearly established by the evidence. 
I think you will recall that while I could see Sampsonfs 
representation of Richtron companies in various lawsuits was 
probably—turned out to be a conflict of interest when he was 
also opposing them, and that that might have been a breach of 
duty, maybe there was a negligence on the part of Sampson as 
alleged in one of the counts. I felt that while those particular 
counts may have been proven insofar as allegations of wrong doing 
was concerned, the record didn't present specific evidence that 
enabled me to say, yes, because he represented, and I expect 
maybe Mr- Anderson might talk about this in his, because he 
represented us in a dozen lawsuits, or was supposed to represent 
us and failed to do so we had default judgments taken against 
us. 
The record doesn't tell me what the defendants' damages were 
as a result of proximate cause of those factors. And I felt that 
the tort, and I stress the tort aspect of the cause of action 
about the intentional interference with an existing economic 
relation, and I don't think we'll ever get a more clear cut 
example of that being done than we have in 
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this case. 
But that particular thing was not a contract violation. 
Recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships. It was a tort 
just like you run a red light and crash into your car. I commit 
a tort and you are injured. And you are entitled to recover 
damages. But how much? Well, the jury says $25,000. You wanted 
$100,000. You get $25,000, see. 
And, so, I considered the evidence at substantial length. 
What exactly was the total of the advances made by the general 
partners to the limited partners. I am trying to say I don't 
know. Because various exhibits that came into evidence gave us 
different amounts. $75,000 goes for overhead expenses. I don't 
know what they were. Maybe they were to pay John Sampson's law 
office expenses. I don't know. 
$100,000 goes out to Sampson as attorneys' fees. Well, I 
can't say that he's not entitled to attorneys' fees for all that 
he did in this case, and, therefore, I wouldn't say the money was 
spent for attorneys' fees or that Sampson took for attorneys1 
fees was all wrongfully taken in view of the history of this 
thing and, therefore, that's one specific element of damage that 
the general partners 
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are entitled to recover* 
I think if I took the time I could think of other similar 
examples. A factor that I examined closely and brought out in my 
findings was Richins1 contention with respect to the value of all 
the property which—for which he was seeking millions of dollars 
in damages, you see- Yet on his bankruptcy schedules the value 
of the properties listed as being properties in which RFC had an 
interest fell far below his $9 and $12 million figures that he 
set forth in some of his exhibits. I have no way of knowing what 
value of the loss of those properties could be assessed if any. 
I guess I will talk more about this when I hear from Mr. 
Anderson. But I concluded that Richins* conduct was indeed 
intentional. That it was an interference. 
I don't mean Richins. I mean Sampson. That it was an 
interference with an existing economic relationship—several 
existing economic relationships. As I pointed out in seven 
months at the end of 1980 he literally controlled all of the 
partnerships. And there is something to be said for his doing 
that on the other side of the question, too. And I recognize 
that. And we111 probably talk about that some more with Mr. 
Anderson. 
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But the end result is that is the defendants in the case end 
up with nothing because of Sampson's conduct. And I felt that 
his conduct justified as a substantial recovery. And as I said, 
I wrestled with my thoughts for hours trying to think of a basis 
for fixing a figure, and that's the figure I came up with. It's 
less than what some exhibits claim the advances were. I think I 
pointed out in my findings that the repayment of those advances 
had substantial uncertainty if all of the partnerships had been 
dissolved and liquidated in an orderly, proper fashion, all 
expenses paid and the property sold for the best price they could 
collect. 
I point out that there still may not have been any money 
left to pay all or even part of the advances. So, I don't think 
that the advances gives me necessarily an accurate measure of 
damages that I could award to them. If I had done so it would 
be, maybe, $100,000 more than it is. 
There were many factors that I weighed and considered and 
you see them scattered throughout my findings. And, so, I just 
concluded this is a tort. Damages was caused by Sampson through 
his conduct. I find it was not such conduct as justified 
punitive damages, and will be talking about that, I am sure, but 
that the defendants were entitled to a substantial 
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recovery- In no sense of the word could I go to Richins $5 
million and $6 million and $9 million and $12 million figures in 
arriving at damages because the evidence wasn't there. Credible 
evidence wasn't there that I could accept as being a proper 
foundation for a measure of damages. But I just say that that's 
the amount I came up with and I don't think I am obligated to say 
that the $250,000 is made up of $250,000 in advances which I 
think he would have recovered if they'd have orderly liquidated 
all of the partnerships or that it is made up of $100,000 
attorneys' fees Sampson took plus the $75,000 that he used for 
overhead, plus another $75,000 for some other specific item. 
You see, and that's the reason I did what I did, and I don't 
think I can really—need to do or can do any different. 
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